Introduction
This account of European policy making in France covers the Sarkozy presidency from its start in May 2007 to December 2008, and must begin with a series of disclaimers.
First, it only covers approximately eighteen months, hence there are limits to the scope of the conclusions one can draw. Second, for six months France held the Presidency of the EU Council -hardly a representative period in terms of assessing the policies of any state towards the European Union, though one that requires broad coverage (hence the range of policies covered by this article). Third, these six months were themselves a period in which France, like other member states, rather than setting an agenda, had to react to a series of profoundly unsettling crises: first in Georgia, then in the world's financial markets. Nevertheless, certain tentative conclusions can be drawn about President Sarkozy's approach towards the European Union, the main one being that the traditional tension between European ambitions and national objectives has not disappeared (see Menon, 2000) . In that context, it appears that the EU is more The Sarkozy camp made some strident claims about the failings of French EU policy under Chirac. The new President argued that, when he took office, 'France was on Europe's "substitutes' bench" ' (Sarkozy 2008) . This declining influence was attributed to policy failures, and in particular the fact that France 'was still playing the European game in a way that perhaps had its merits 20 years ago, but was out of sync with the realities of today's Europe' (Sarkozy 2008) .
In response, Sarkozy emphasized the need to challenge two traditional aspects of policy.
First, the relative disdain in which Paris had held the EU institutions. 'How,' asked the new inhabitant of the Élysée Palace, 'can we act in Europe if our objective is to oppose the Commission or to oppose the European Parliament? We would be doomed to fail' (Sarkozy, 2007a) . Second, France needed to work more closely with its partners; under the new regime, 'in Europe France is determined to be a team player!' (Sarkozy, 2008) .
Bernard Kouchner mirrored this rhetoric, informing the European Parliament's Foreign
Affairs committee at the start of the French Presidency (15 July 2008) that France had the 'ambition to be modest ' (Euractiv.com, 16 July 2008) .
Sarkozy was also quick to break with past practice in terms of key personnel decisions. (Sarkozy, 2007b: 6) . Sarkozy's campaign pledge (Sarkozy, 2007d) . Once this had been achieved, the ratification of the new treaty by the French parliament was swift and consistent with another of his core campaign pledges 5 .
Another key aspect of the new President's EU policy has been his firm opposition to 4 This latter claim was in keeping with his criticism of the énarques at the domestic level. 5 While Sarkozy had supported the idea of a reform treaty focusing on institutional reform, his main rival, Ségolène Royal was in favour of a more substantial reform of the treaty followed by a referendum (Henderson and Sitter, 2008, p. 190 preferring instead a 'common economic and security area' that in addition to Turkey would also include Russia (Sarkozy, 2009 ). This tactic allowed him to (i) maintain a campaign pledge without alienating key partners (notably the German Christian
Democrats who share his opposition to Turkey's membership), (ii) limit negotiations to those chapters that do not imply full membership and (iii) press for the creation of a 'reflection group' to discuss the issue of 'quelle Europe en 2020-2030 et pour quelles missions?' in order to keep the issue of the Union's frontiers and finalité on the agenda (Sarkozy 2007a ). However, Sarkozy was constrained by his partners' insistence that the 'reflection group' be debarred from considering institutional issues (European Council 2008) .
Enlargement, particularly the issue of Turkish membership, is so salient in French domestic politics that Jacques Chirac had felt the need to constrain his successors through a constitutional clause that requires a referendum prior to further expansion.
This provision -introduced by a politically weak President -was primarily aimed at reassuring the French public that enlargement would not proceed without popular consent.
Sarkozy was amongst many in the French political elite who wanted to abolish this clause; he was provided with an opportunity to do so by the Balladur Committee that he had tasked with putting forward proposals for constitutional reform ( parliamentarians from Sarkozy's own party, the UMP, revolted over the issue. As a result the constitutional requirement for a referendum has been retained in the event that accession is not approved by a 3/5 of a congress bringing together both houses of parliament (itself convened by majorities of 3/5 of each of these chambers) (Quatremer, (Bowen, 2007) . In keeping with his predecessor's policies, Sarkozy gave priority to the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (Sarkozy, 2007c) . Particular emphasis was placed on enhancing military capabilities, involving ideas such as the development of shared military assets (such as a European pool of A400M transport aircraft), industrial consolidation and more effective burden sharing between member states (a prominent 9 Indeed, Sarkozy's potentially most controversial remarks related not to substance but to process, as he questioned the traditional Presidential domaine reservé incorporating defence, arguing in favour of greater parliamentary involvement in the definition of defence policy (Sarkozy, 2007e ) -promises on which he arguably has yet to deliver (Major and Mölling, 2007) .
theme both in opposition and in power was dissatisfaction with a situation in which 'only three or four member states' spend enough on defence) (Sarkozy, 2007c) . He hinted that
France would need to 'adapt its discourse' in terms of acknowledging the complementarity between ESDP and NATO (Sarkozy 2007e) . At the same time, he maintained a degree of continuity with traditional French policy in declaring that NATO
should not 'evolve -as the United States seems to want -into a global organization carrying out military, humanitarian and international policing missions. NATO should not become a competitor organization to the UN' (Sarkozy, 2007c; 2007e) . In keeping with the tenor of his presidential campaign, Sarkozy portrayed himself as an innovator, stressing that 'consensus, continuity, the permanence of certain principles, cannot be presupposed…it is not enough to express the same concepts, reasoning or certainties' (Sarkozy, 2007c) .
Once in office, the new president and government not only attempted to put more flesh on these somewhat bare bones, but also to reconstruct the skeleton itself. of a desire on the part of France to allow the EU to compete with NATO (Chatignoux, 2008) .
Contradictions are also discernible within French policy itself, as the traditional tension between European ambitions and national objectives resurfaces (Menon, 2000) . Defence
Minister Hervé Morin emphasised the French priority of relaunching ESDP via an 'armament Europe'. He even spoke of the possibility of European financing for some aspects of defence, with the implication that if 'we are planning to share our defence preoccupations with our European partners, the European institutions must be involved, especially when it comes to budgetary decisions' (Morin, 2007) . The new administration has moved aggressively to promote French arms sales, and to underline that the French arms industry remains a crucial element of the national economy. Morin (2007) stressed that a core objective of the government was to 'preserve our national defence industry' so that France could enjoy 'the necessary degree of autonomy'. Work remains to be done in terms of reconciling potentially contradictory tendencies. . The Presidency will be held jointly by the state holding the EU presidency and a Southern Mediterranean state. The union's secretariat will be based in Barcelona and it will organise projects that focus on energy, civil protection, infrastructure and the protection of the environment -including some that had already been launched under the Barcelona process, financed by a budget of some 600 million euros (Español and Patrie, 2008 
